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Abstract— Benford's Law shows the pattern of behavior in 
normal systems. It states that in natural systems digits' 
frequency has a certain pattern such that the frequency of 
numbers' first digits is not evenly distributed. In systems with 
natural behavior, numbers begin with a "1" are more common 
than numbers beginning with "9". It has many applications in 
forensic accounting, stock market, finding abnormal data in 
survey data, and natural science. It implies that if the 
distribution of first digits is outside of the expected distribution 
it can be indicative of fraud. In this paper, we investigate 
whether bots and Information Operations’ activities conform 
to this law. Our results showed that Bots’ behavior do not 
adhere to Benford's Law, suggesting that using this law helps 
in detecting malicious online accounts and activities on social 
media. However, activities related to Information Operations 
did not show consistency in regards to the number distribution. 
Our findings shed light on the importance of examining 
regular and anomalous online behavior to avoid malicious and 
contaminated content on social media. This is the first attempt 
in investigating automated accounts and Information 
Operations’ activities in terms of adherence to the law of 
digital fraud. 
Keywords—social bots, Information Operations, Benford’s 
law 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Benford's Law is an auditing tool for fraud detection. 
Fraud detection in social media is gaining increase attention 
and studies resolve the issue by machine learning 
techniques. Benford’s law applies to accounting forensics 
[1], finance [2], survey data [3], natural science [4], and 
religion [5]. According to this Law, digits' frequency has a 
certain pattern such that the frequency of numbers' first 
digits is not evenly distributed. In systems with natural 
behavior, numbers begin with a "1" are more common (more 
than six times as frequent) than numbers beginning with "9" 
[6]. Therefore, the probability that the first digit of a number 
is one is about 30 percent, whereas the probability of nine 
being the first digit is 4.6 percent. Table 1 shows the 
probabilities of all digits 0 to 9 in each of the first four places 
in any number. In this study, we apply this law to the 
anomalous behavior in online social media including 
activities of bots and Information Operations (hereafter IO). 
The word "bot" is derived from the word "robot", which 
is defined as automated agents that function on an online 
platform [7]. They are computer programs that are 
persistent, autonomous, reactive, run continuously, 
formulate decisions, and activated by itself [8]. There are 
various typologies known for bots including Webrobots, 
Chatbots, Spambots, Social bots, Sockpuppets, Trolls, and 
Cyborgs [9]. In this study, we use datasets containing 
Spambots, Social bots, and Trolls, because research shows 
that 15% of Twitter traffic are created by bots [10]. 
Webrobots are used for crawling the Internet and 
                                                          
1 https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/elections-integrity.html#data 
information retrieval. Chatbots are usually engaged in 
natural conversations with humans [9]. Therefore, the 
purpose of Webrobots and Chatbots incite different 
definition and operation for them, and they do not need to 
be detected.  Whereas, other typologies have different 
definitions which causes them to be leveraged for malicious 
purposed, for example spreading misinformation or 
impersonating other people. Therefore, we run our analysis 
on datasets containing Spambots, Social bots, and Trolls. 
IO run by influence campaigns try to manipulate online 
discussions are becoming a serious concern [11]. There are 
studies dedicated to analyze these campaigns in terms of the 
discourse they are involved in, their dynamics, and influence 
measurements [11][12].There is no prior study on 
examining IO activities in terms of following digital fraud 
patterns as they are understood to be malicious and 
malevolent activities. 
 In this study, we investigate whether the activities of 
automated agents and IO conform to the law of naturally-
occurring systems. Table I provides the frequencies and 
probabilities of each digit for normal systems. To 
accomplish this, we conducted two sets of analyses of four 
datasets for social bots and seven datasets originating from 
state-backed information operations 1. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is lack of research on applying Benford's 
Law to bots' activities as well as IO activities. It is important 
to know these activities because they are very common and 
are growing. We are trying to know whether social bots' and 
IO activities adhere or deviate from the law of normal 
systems and behaviors. Therefore, we address two research 
questions: 
RQ1: Do Information Operations and social bots' 
activities adhere to Benford's Law? 
 
TABLE 1. EXPECTED FREQUENCIES BASED ON BENFORD'S LAW 
Digit 1st place 2nd place 3rd place 4th place 
0  .11968 .10178 .10018 
1 .30103 .11389 .10138 .10014 
2 .17609 .19882 .10097 .10010 
3 .12494 .10433 .10057 .10006 
4 .09691 .10031 .10018 .10002 
5 .07918 .09668 .09979 .09998 
6 .06695 .09337 .09940 .09994 
7 .05799 .09035 .09902 .09990 
8 .05115 .08757 .09864 .09986 
9 .04576 .08500 .09827 .09982 
 
Our research objective is to see whether bots and IO 
characteristics follow the Benford's Law. Our study 
contributes to the research by finding out whether malicious 
online activities adhere to a law which exists in natural 
systems. We found out that bots’ activities show 
nonconformity to the Benford’s law. However, trolls’ 
activities do not show a consistent pattern. 
II. MOTIVATION 
Social networks have made the world smaller and people 
closer to each other. Services like Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram have provided a ubiquitous service to connect 
people. Nowadays most individuals use social media for 
entertainment, getting news, and other various purposes. 
Therefore, they are exposed to overwhelming information 
spread from both human and automated agents. Bots are 
responsible for significant proportions of online activity. 
While Subramanian and colleagues [13] found out that 
about 8.5% of all Twitter users were bots, other studies show 
16% of Twitter traffic is generated by bots [14]. They also 
play a major role in disseminating hyperpartisan "fake 
news", particularly during special events like elections [15] 
[16]. Further, bots can impersonate real people and deceive 
the audience. Therefore, it is important to know how pattern 
of bots' activities look like.  
IO is run with the purpose of interfering in foreign countries' 
affairs. Thus, there is a need to understand these activities 
more in order to be able to detect them and tackle their 
consequences. In this study, we assume that both these 
activities are fraudulent, and seek to understand them better 
in terms of their conformity to the law of normal behaviors. 
Further, this study contributes to the field of cyber security 
by understanding online spammers especially because both 
can be used for propaganda and public opinion 
manipulation. 
 
A. Theoretical basis 
Benford's Law is an auditing tool for fraud detection. In 
states that in systems with natural behavior, numbers begin 
with a "1" are more common (more than six times as 
frequent) than numbers beginning with "9" [1]. Therefore, 
the probability that the first digit of a number is 1 is about 
30 percent, whereas the probability of 9 being the first digit 
is 4.6 percent. It shows that in systems with normal 
behaviors for a digit d the formula for predicting its 
frequency p is as follows: 
𝑷𝑷(𝒅𝒅) = 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏(𝟏𝟏 +
𝟏𝟏
𝒅𝒅
)                             (𝟏𝟏) 
According to this Law, digits' frequency has a certain 
pattern such that the frequency of numbers' first digits is not 
evenly distributed. In systems with natural behavior, 
numbers begin with a "1" are more common (more than six 
times as frequent) than numbers beginning with "9" [1]. 
Therefore, the probability that the first digit of a number is 
one is about 30 percent, whereas the probability of nine 
being the first digit is 4.6 percent. Table 1 shows the 
probabilities of all digits 0 to 9 in each of the first four places 
in any number. We start with the law of first significant digit 
for the first digit: 
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒍𝒍𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑷𝑷𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒇 𝒅𝒅𝒇𝒇𝒍𝒍𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 = 𝒅𝒅)
= 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒅𝒅−𝟏𝟏)   𝒅𝒅 = 𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐, … ,𝟗𝟗         (𝟐𝟐) 
The law of second significant digit states that: 
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒍𝒍𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑷𝑷𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒇 𝒅𝒅𝒇𝒇𝒍𝒍𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 = 𝒅𝒅)
= �𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏(𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒅𝒅)−𝟏𝟏)       𝒅𝒅
𝟗𝟗
𝟏𝟏=𝟏𝟏
= 𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐, … ,𝟗𝟗                                      (𝟑𝟑) 




� = 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝒇𝒇      𝒇𝒇 ∈ [𝟏𝟏,𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏)     (𝟒𝟒) 
Mantissa of a positive real number is defined as the unique 
number r in [ 𝟏𝟏
𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
,𝟏𝟏) with 𝒙𝒙 = 𝑷𝑷 ∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔 for some integer n  
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒍𝒍𝑷𝑷 �𝒎𝒎𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒔𝒔 (𝑷𝑷𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒇𝒃𝒃 𝑷𝑷) ≤
𝒇𝒇
𝑷𝑷
� = 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝑷𝑷 𝒇𝒇     𝒇𝒇𝒍𝒍𝑷𝑷 𝒔𝒔𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍   𝒇𝒇
∈ [𝟏𝟏,𝑷𝑷)                                              (𝟓𝟓) 
Therefore, the general significant-digit law looks like: 
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒍𝒍𝑷𝑷(𝑫𝑫𝟏𝟏 = 𝒅𝒅𝟏𝟏, … ,𝑫𝑫𝟏𝟏 = 𝒅𝒅𝟏𝟏)




   (𝟔𝟔) 
𝐟𝐟𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐟 𝐚𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐥𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩 𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐥𝐩𝐩𝐟𝐟𝐩𝐩 𝐤𝐤, 𝐚𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝐝𝐝𝟏𝟏 ∈ {𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐, …, 9} and 
dj ∈ {0,1, …, 9}, j=2, …, k 
Using Benford's law for the first two digits is more 
common in fraud detection and is more reliable than 
considering only the first digit [17]. Following is the 
common formula for the law for the first two significant 
digits: 





            (𝟕𝟕) 
      𝑑𝑑1𝑑𝑑2 ∈ [10,11, … ,98,99] 
III. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we give an overview of studies on social 
bots, trolls and IO, and Benford’s law applications. 
Bots. Studies on bot detection mainly leverage machine 
learning techniques to improve the performance of bot 
detection, understanding [18], characterizing [19], and 
classifying them [20] [21]. For example, bot detection 
studies have leveraged graph-based features [22] [23], 
contextual information [24], sentiment analysis [25], 
temporal features [10], and hybrid feature sets [26]. 
Additionally, there are studies on classifying and 
characterizing bots which introduce typologies and 
taxonomies of bots in order to provide a better 
understanding of them [27] [9]. Additionally, there are real-
time bot detection platforms like Debot [10], BotOrNot [26], 
and BotWalk [28] 
Trolls. Research in the area of trolls is more toward 
finding out what trolls are trying to disseminate, especially 
during election or other political events [16][29], and how 
they participate in online discourse to manipulate the public 
opinion [11]. Trolls are considered a specific type of 
accounts called sockpuppets run mainly with political 
purposes [9]. This is the first attempt to examine troll’s 
activities in terms of conformity to online fraud pattern. 
Benford’s Law. The first article published on Benford’s 
Law was written by Simon Newcomb when he observed the 
beginning pages of the book were more frequently used and 
worn out compared to the last pages. He discovered that 
other scientists used tables with lower numbers than tables 
with higher numbers, concluding that numbers with lower 
digits are more frequent than numbers with higher digits. He 






Where p is the probability for digit d. For more empirical 
evidence and explanation about the Benford's law and its 
bases see [17]. Initially, Newcomb’s article did not receive 
much attention, likely due to a lack of theoretical 
explanation [1]. After 50 years, physicist Frank Benford 
realized the same pattern that the first few pages of his books 
were more worn out than the last pages. He also asserted that 
the numbers beginning with low digits are more common. 
Thus, he came to the same conclusion and tested his 
hypothesis by collecting and analyzing more than 20,000 
observations from various sources like areas of rivers and 
atomic weights of elements [31]. Therefore, Benford’s law 
is sometimes referred to as  Newcomb-Benford's Law [32]. 
Benford's Law has variety of applications in stock market 
[33], natural sciences (such as physics, astronomy, 
geophysics, chemistry, and so forth) [34], world religions 
[5], finance [2], tax returns [34], and social networks [35]. 
IV. DATA 
We analyze the behavioral pattern of social bots and IO 
on Twitter because these accounts are widespread and play 
a major role in misinformation spread in online social 
media. In order to accomplish this, we collected datasets on 
bots and trolls from different resources to run our analysis 
on them. For examining social bots we collected 10 datasets 
including Texas A&M Social Honeypot [36], 
Socialspambot annotated by Cresci and colleagues [37], and 
Twitter bots datasets by [18].  
For analyzing IO activities, we gathered 7 collections of 
Twitter integrity datasets released by Twitter on February 
8th, 2019. Twitter believes that these accounts originate from 
state-back Information Operations and therefore, suspended 
the accounts. It contains 25,076,853 tweets from 2009 to 
2018. There are 3613 accounts connected to Russia Internet 
Research Agency (RIRA), 770 accounts originate from Iran, 
15 accounts come from Bangladesh, 2320 accounts in a 
separate collection originate from Iran, 416 accounts from 
Russia, 1196 accounts from Venezuela, 764 accounts in a 
separate set from Venezuela.  
We run the analysis for both human accounts and bots 
accounts. We focus on following count, follower count, 
favorite count, reply count, retweet count in analyzing all 
datasets except for ZafarGilani's datasets because they have 
follower_following_ratio rather than separate following 
count and follower count. In ZafarGilani's dataset there is 
only follower to friend ratio, statuses count, favorites count, 
retweet count, and reply count and therefore, we exhibit the 
results for bots and humans across these features. We run 
the analysis for both human and bot accounts. 




Number of followers, number of 
followings, number of tweets 
Socialhoneypot legitimate 
users 
Number of followers, number of 










Statuses count, number of followers, 
number of following, number of 
favorites, number of listed 
ZafarGilani Statuses count, number of favorites, 
number of replied 
 
TABLE III. TROLLS' DATASET. THESE ARE TWITTER ELECTIONS 
INTEGRITY DATASET. TWITTER BELIEVES THESE ACCOUNTS ARE PART OF 
STATE-BACKED INFORMATION OPERATIONS. 
Dataset Number of users Number of tweets 
Bangladesh 15 26214 
Iran 2320 2311 4447056 
Iran 770 771 1122936 
RIRA 3608 8768633 
Russia 416 416 765246 
Venezuela 1196 1196 8961788 
Venezuela 764 755 984980 
 
V. ANALYSIS AND METHODS 
For testing how the data fits the Benford's distribution 
(test of goodness-of-fit), we use Pearson's chi-squared test, 
Mantissa Arc test, Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), and 
Distortion Factor to ensure the robustness of the results.  
Pearson chi-squared test: the first step in this test is to 
calculate the chi-squared test statistic, 𝜒𝜒2 . It shows a 
normalized sum of squared deviations between observed 
and theoretical frequencies. Second, we need to calculate 
the degrees of freedom of the statistic. Since we consider 
all of the 9 possible digits, the degrees of freedom will be 
9-1=8. The null hypothesis is that the data follows the 
Benford's distribution [33]. The test statistic is calculated 
using this formula: 




𝑖𝑖=1    (8) 
• Mantissa Arc test (MAT): for a positive real 
number x, Mantissa is the unique number r in [ 1
10,1
) with 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 10𝑛𝑛  for some integer n [17]. More details about 
Mantissa is in the theory section (section A). In MAT, each 
data point xi is mapped to a unit circle with the following 
coordinates: 
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = cos (2𝜋𝜋 ∗ (log10( 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑1))       (9) 
𝑦𝑦 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = sin�2𝜋𝜋
∗ (𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙10(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑1)�         (10) 
The reason behind having modulus 1 is that we only 
need to take the right side of the decimal point. The center 
of the unit circle is called mean vector and its coordinates 
are calculated using following equations (actually average 
of data points' coordinates): 
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =
∑ cos (2𝜋𝜋 ∗ (log10(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑1)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁          (11) 
𝑦𝑦 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =
∑ sin (2𝜋𝜋 ∗ (log10(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑1)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁       (12) 
If the mean vector (center of the circle) is at (0,0), 
mantissas of the data points are uniformly distributed on 
the unit circle. The length of the mean vector is shown by 
L2, and therefore the test statistic for MAT is defined as 
[38]: 
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 = 1 − 𝑐𝑐−𝐿𝐿2×𝑁𝑁                                  (13) 
The null hypothesis is that the data is uniformly 
distributed, and the degrees of freedom is 2. For further 
detail on this test see [38]. 
• Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD): this test 
calculates the average deviation of data points (OBSi) from 
Benford's data points (BENi). The MAD test statistic is:  
𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
=
∑ |𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 − 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖|𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑘𝑘
                (14)  
As Nigrini suggests, the cutoff point for non-
conformity to Benford's distribution is MAD ≥  0.002 , 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝜖𝜖 [ 0.0018, 0.0022]  as marginally acceptable 
conformity, 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝜖𝜖 [ 0.0012, 0.0018]  as acceptable 
conformity, and MAD ≤  0.0012 as close conformity 
[38].  
• Distortion Factor (DF): this test checks whether the 
data points are overstated (positive number) or 
understated (negative number). For example, the DF 
value of 0.0054 suggests that the numbers are overstated 
by 54 percent. Thus, it calculates the difference between 
the actual mean (AM) and expected mean (EM) [38]. Its 
test statistic is: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
                                            (15) 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Bots’ results. In Socialhoneypot [20] and Socialspambot 
[37] datasets we have the statistics for bots as well as 
genuine accounts. Therefore, we compare the results for 
both across the features. Fig 1, Fig 2, and Fig 3 illustrate the 
results for follower count, statuses count, and following 
count for bots and humans in Socialhoneypot dataset, 
suggesting that legitimate accounts conform to the 
Benford’s law distribution, whereas bots’ statistics do not. 
For Bots’ account features all tests showed nonconformity 
(Table V). In order to examine the real accounts’ activities, 
we tested two datasets and results suggests conformity for 
real accounts (Table IV). 
  
Fig. 1. First digit distribution for fake followers (left) and genuine 
accounts (right) for their followers. These accounts are from Crecsi 2017 




Fig. 2. First digit distribution for statuses counts for bots (left) versus 
genuine accounts (right) 
  
Fig. 3. First digit distribution for following count for bots (left) versus 
genuine accounts (right).  
We use three tests on datasets and the results of these 
tests are not coherent sometimes. For example, in 
Socialspambot1 for the statuses count feature, two tests 
(Pearson’s Chi-squared and Mean Absolute Devian) 
showed nonconformity and only MAT indicated conformity 
(Table VI). In these cases, we chose to use a voting strategy 
and decided based on the result of the majority of tests as 
well as looking at the visual results. Additionally, it is said 
that in testing Benford’s law we should not rely only on p-
value because even the real data does not conform to 
Benford’s distribution perfectly [38].  
 
TABLE IV. REAL ACCOUNTS’ FEATURES AND THEIR CONFORMITY TO THE 
BENFORD’S DISTRIBUTION 
dataset Features Adherence to Benford’s law 
Legitimate 
users 
Following 2 tests Conformity 
Follower 2 tests Conformity 
Statuses count All tests conformity 
Favorites count Does not exist for this dataset 
Genuine 
accounts 
Following 2 tests conformity 
Follower 2 tests conformity 
Statuses All tests conformity 
Favorites count All tests conformity 
 
TABLE V. FEATURES OF BOTS AND THEIR CONFORMITY TO THE 
BENFORD’S LAW 
Features Adherence to Benford’s law 
following Nonconformity 
Follower Nonconformity  
Statuses count Nonconformity  
Favorites count Nonconformity  
 
TABLE VI. EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENT TEST RESULTS FOR STATUSES COUNT 
IN SOCIALSPAMBOT1 DATASET 




X-squared = 66.365, 
df = 8, p-value = 2.59
e-11 
Nonconformity 
Mantissa Arc Test L2 = 0.001894, df = 2






For the bots collection by Zafar Gilani and colleagues 
[18], we tested follower to following ratio,  statuses count, 
favorite count, retweet count, and reply count. Fig. 4, Fig. 5, 
and Fig. 6 show the results for Zafar Gilani’s dataset. For 
human accounts, chi-square and MAD tests show 
nonconformity to the distribution, whereas MAT shows 
conformity for tweeting behavior and therefore, we use the 
voting strategy and mark it as nonconformity. Therefore, 
while tweeting, retweeting, replying, and 
follower_friend_ratio behavior does not represent 
conformity, favoriting shows conformity. For bot accounts, 
tweeting, replying, and favoriting show conformity, while 
retweeting and follower_friend_ratio exhibit 
nonconformity.  
In fact, in this dataset, both bots and humans exhibit 
similar and unexpected behaviors. We argue that these 
results might be due to their data collection. In their data 
collection, Zafar Gilani manually categorize bots and 
humans using a team of four people and based on that data 
collection they get their results for the characterization of 
bots versus humans [39]. Another reason might be that they 
collected the tweet behavior of accounts and they consider 
tweeting, replying, and mentioning as a single action and 
therefore, their graph is more of a communication graph. In 
contrast, other datasets have a static snapshot of the 
accounts' features rather than communication graph 
features. Further research is needed to investigate the 
attributes of communications across these features for bots 
versus humans. Detailed results of tests for bots and humans 
in ZafarGilani’s dataset are shown in Table VII.  
  
Fig. 4. Statuses count for bots (left) versus humans (right) tweeting 
behavior in Zafar Gilan’s dataset 
 
  
Fig. 5. Favoriting behavior for bots versus humans in Zafar Gilani’s 
behavior 
  
Fig. 6. Replying behavior for bots versus humans in Zafar Gilani’s dataset 
  
Fig. 7. Follower_following_ration for bots (left) and humans (right) in 
Zafar Gilani’s dataset 
Table VII. Test results for ZafarGilani’s dataset 
Accounts Feature Test result 
Bots Following Does not exist 
 Follower Does not exist 
 Statuses count 1 test nonconformity 
 Favorites count 1 test nonconformity 
 Retweet count nonconformity 
 Reply count conformity 
 Follower_following_ratio nonconformity 
Humans Following Does not exist 
 Follower Does not exist 
 Statuses count 2 tests nonconformity 
 Favorites count All tests conformity 
 Retweet count nonconformity 
 Reply count 2 tests conformity 
 Follower_following_ratio nonconformity 
 
Our findings of IO activities show none of them conform 
to Benford’s law for follower count. While following count 
for Venezuela, Iran770, and RIRA exhibit conformity to the 
law, the rest of them do not. Regarding like count, 
Russia416, Venezuela764, Iran770, Venezuela1196, 
Iran2320, and Bangladesh represent conformity. Reply 
count statistics for Russia416, Iran770, Venezuela1196, 
Iran2320 adhere the law. Retweet count behavior 
Russia416, Venezuela764, Iran770, Venezuela1196, 
Iran2320, conform to the law and only Bangladesh does not. 
In other words, we cannot say all trolls’ activities deviate 
from the Benford’s law distribution.  
 
  
Fig. 8. RIRA accounts follower and following distribution 
These findings are coherent with findings of [35] and 
give more specific insight about automated accounts and 
accounts run by foreign agents. One might be interested in 
investigating the use of this law as an underlying tool for 
auditing online world, rising this question "Are all activities 
not conforming to Benford's law classified into malicious 
activities?" or "Can Social media platforms use Benford's 
Law as a solely tool to detect and suspend the accounts?". 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We analyzed the online anomalous behavior in terms of 
conforming to the law of normal systems. Previous research 
shows that all normal behaviors have similar patterns in that 
the probability of occurrence of number 1 is more than 
number 2 and so on. This study was the first attempt to 
examine the activities of automated accounts and IO in their 
adherence to the law of normal systems. Our findings 
indictaed that bots’ activities do not adhere to the Benford’s 
law. Expectedly, the real accounts represented conformity 
to the law. These results are in line with the findings of 
previous research which found that Benford’s law applies to 
online social networks. However, the IO activities did not 
show any consistent pattern in this regard. While some 
features showed conformity, some did not. These results 
have implications in better understanding the malicious 
online activities and contributes to the field of cyber 
security. Future research will consider examining other 
types of bots’ activities such as Chatbots, Webrobots, and 
bots on other platforms.  
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